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 Abstract 
 How errors and confl ict are processed in the human brain, 
has been extensively investigated over the last decades. In 
this review, we argue that error research has mainly focused 
on one type of errors, namely errors at the response level. 
Furthermore, research on confl ict and errors has primarily 
used a very restricted set of experimental paradigms, rais-
ing the question as to whether the results from this research 
can be generalized to other forms of errors and confl ict. We 
thus argue to approach errors and confl ict from a broader 
perspective. 
 Keywords:  confl ict;  error;  SRC task;  task and response 
level. 
 Introduction 
 In daily life, we constantly adjust our behavior according to 
the fl exible demands of the environment. Situations of confl ict 
and errors form key aspects for these behavioral adjustments. 
Moreover, a situation of confl ict, or an error, signals that the 
current behavior is no longer appropriate and that adjustments 
are needed. Over the past decades, an innumerable amount of 
studies on error and confl ict monitoring have emerged. In the 
fi rst part of this review, we will give a short overview of the 
classical research conducted on error and confl ict processing. 
Because this literature has been extensively reviewed else-
where (e.g., Botvinick et al. , 2001 ; Ridderinkhof et al. , 2004 ; 
Ullsperger and von Cramon , 2004 ), this overview will be 
very brief. Thereafter, we will show that current research has 
approached errors and confl ict from a narrow point of view. 
More precisely, the classical literature has focused on one 
type of errors and on one type of experimental design. 
 Response errors and response confl ict 
 In the laboratory, a range of stimulus-response compatibility 
(SRC) tasks, such as the fl anker task (Eriksen and Eriksen , 
1974 ) or the Simon task (Simon , 1969 ), have been frequently 
used to study confl ict and errors. Typically, in these sorts of 
tasks, a confl ict at the response level occurs. In other words, 
participants have to perform a response while irrelevant infor-
mation is interfering with this correct response. For example, in 
the fl anker task, the direction of a central arrow has to be deter-
mined (left or right). In a situation of confl ict, the surrounding 
arrows will point in the opposite direction and consequently 
activate the wrong response. Due to this situation of response 
confl ict, response errors will arise more frequently than in non-
confl icting situations. Usually, response errors and response 
confl ict are thus studied within the same experiments. 
 At a behavioral level, several robust post error and post 
confl ict effects have been documented. First of all, it has 
been observed that participants are slower after an error than 
after a correct response. Post error slowing has served as evi-
dence for an adjustment in control after an error (Laming , 
1968 ; Botvinick et al. , 2001 ). That is, after an error, partici-
pants will increase control to avoid errors in the future and 
therefore be slower on subsequent trials. Recently, however, 
it has been suggested that post error slowing can be seen as 
an attentional effect rather than as a control effect (Notebaert 
et al. , 2009 ; N ú ñ ez Castellar et al., 2010). Secondly, a well 
established fi nding regarding post confl ict processing, is the 
confl ict adaptation effect. This refers to reduced interference 
effects after confl ict trials compared to after no confl ict trials. 
This effect, fi rst described by Gratton and colleagues in the 
fl anker task, has been interpreted as a cognitive control effect 
(Gratton et al. , 1992 ). Namely, a confl ict trial will ask for 
more control, resulting in a smaller interference effect on the 
next trial. The confl ict adaptation effect has been replicated 
in a wide range of tasks, including Simon tasks (Sturmer et 
al. , 2002 ), Stroop Tasks (Kerns et al. , 2004 ), and prime-target 
congruency effects (Kunde , 2003 ). However, until now, it is 
still unclear to what extend stimulus repetitions can account 
for the adaptation effect (Mayr et al. , 2003 ; Mayr and Awh , 
2009 ; Funes et al. , 2010 ). 
 At a neural level, a negative defl ection, occurring 50  ms 
after the onset of a response error, has been well documented. 
This event-related potential (ERP) component is assumed to 
refl ect confl ict between concurring responses (Botvinick et 
al. , 2001 ) or to signal an outcome that is worse than expected 
(Holroyd and Coles , 2002 ) and has been labeled the error 
related negativity (ERN). Further, the rostral cingulate zone 
(RCZ) has been suggested to be the main generator of the ERN 
(Ullsperger and von Cramon , 2001 ; Ridderinkhof et al. , 2004 ). 
The neural correlates of response errors and response confl ict 
have been reported in more detail in an enormous number 
of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies 
(Ridderinkhof et al. , 2004 ). The posterior fronto median cortex 
(pFMC), and in particular the RCZ is considered as being 
extremely crucial for adaptive control (Ullsperger and von 
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Cramon , 2001 ,  2004 ; Ridderinkhof et al. , 2004 ). Whether, 
errors and confl ict are processed in the same brain regions, 
however, is still an open issue. Some studies have shown that 
the RCZ is activated both by errors and confl ict (Carter et al. , 
1998 ; Kerns et al. , 2004 ). This is in accordance with the con-
fl ict monitoring theory (Botvinick et al. , 2001 ). This theory 
states that the RCZ will be activated whenever two responses 
compete. That is, both in the cases of response confl ict and 
response errors. In this view, response errors are thus special 
cases of response confl ict. However, others have reported a 
distinction in the pFMC between errors and confl ict. These 
latter studies showed more ventral parts related to response 
errors and more dorsal parts of the pFMC related to response 
confl ict (Kiehl et al. , 2000 ; Braver et al. , 2001 ; Ullsperger and 
von Cramon , 2001 ; Wittfoth et al. , 2008 ). This relation is in 
accordance with the connections of the pFMC to motor output. 
In particular, ventral parts of the pFMC are more related to the 
primary motor cortex and the spinal cord, whereas dorsal parts 
are connected to brain areas related to high-level motor cogni-
tion (Ullsperger and von Cramon , 2001 ,  2004 ). Since errors 
trigger the tendency to perform the correct response, it seems 
plausible that they are more related to regions correlated with 
motor output than response confl ict. 
 Beyond the response level: task confl ict and task 
errors 
 To this point, we have described literature concerning errors 
and confl ict at a response level. However, confl ict does not 
only occur at the response level, but can also occur at the task 
level. Surprisingly, the literature on task confl ict is completely 
separated from the literature on response confl ict. Two large 
domains of task confl ict studies can be distinguished. First of 
all, several authors have used the Stroop paradigm (Stroop , 
1935 ; Macleod , 1991 ) to study processes related to task con-
fl ict. In the Stroop task, participants are required to name the 
color in which a word is printed while ignoring the meaning 
of the word (which is also a color). In a confl ict situation, 
the meaning of the word and the color in which it is printed, 
will not correspond. In other words, a confl ict at a task level 
emerges (word naming versus color naming). Brain regions 
associated with these situations of confl ict, are the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) and the presupplementary motor area 
(preSMA) (Milham and Banich  2005 ; Woodward et al. , 2008 ; 
Aarts et al. , 2009 ). It should be noted, though, that in these 
paradigms, an infl uence of response related confl ict cannot 
be ruled out entirely because the two tasks (color naming and 
word naming) share the same responses (e.g., green and red). 
This issue was addressed by van Veen and Carter  (2005) . 
They also used a Stroop task, but mapped two colors on one 
response (for example the colors red and yellow should be 
answered by pressing the left button). In this way they could 
disentangle task confl ict from response confl ict. More pre-
cisely, the color naming task and the word naming task could 
indicate different outcomes while at a response level no con-
fl ict emerged (the same response button is required for both 
tasks). These authors found a more dorsal part of the pFMC 
activated by task confl ict (defi ned as semantic confl ict in their 
study) than by response confl ict. Recent attempts showed 
that, also by means of an ex-Gaussian distribution analysis, 
both types of confl ict could be separated in the Stroop task 
( Steinhauser and H ü bner, 2009 ). 
 A different class of paradigms investigating task confl ict 
are the task switching paradigms (Monsell , 2003 ). In these 
kinds of paradigms, people perform two tasks randomly or 
in a predetermined order. A robust fi nding in task switching 
experiments is the switch costs. That is, longer response times 
and more errors occur on task switch trials relative to task 
repetition trials (e.g., Monsell , 2003 ). In task switching stud-
ies, adaptive behavior at the task level thus concentrates on 
the control processes needed to alternate between different 
tasks. Many studies have found a fronto-parietal network to 
be involved in task switching. This network includes the left 
inferior frontal junction, the left posterior superior parietal 
lobule (Ruge et al. , 2005 ), regions along the inferior frontal 
sulcus, the left intraparietal sulcus, the anterior insula (Dove 
et al. , 2000 ), the ACC (Hyafi l et al. , 2009 ) and the preSMA 
(Brass and von Cramon , 2002 ; Rushworth et al. , 2002 ; Crone 
et al. , 2006 ). Importantly, task switching does not only require 
resolution of confl ict at the task level, but also involves other 
processes such as goal setting and response related processes 
(e.g., Rubinstein et al. , 2001 ). Therefore, the task switching 
paradigm does not provide a pure measure of task confl ict. 
 In summary, research on adaptation at the response level 
has concentrated on response confl ict and response errors, 
typically measured in SRC tasks. On the other hand, con-
fl ict at the task level has been studied with Stroop and task 
switching paradigms. Surprisingly, to our knowledge no brain 
imaging study has ever investigated the neural correlates of 
task errors. So far, only behavioral studies have addressed 
this issue.  Steinhauser and H ü bner (2006) compared switch 
effects after response errors with switch effects after task 
errors. They observed normal switch costs after response 
errors. However, after task errors, switch benefi ts instead of 
switch costs emerged. The authors explained this fi nding by 
arguing that at the moment of a task error, the wrong task 
is strongly activated. Consequently, subsequent task switches 
will actually represent task repetitions and therefore switch 
benefi ts instead of switch costs appear after a task error. In 
further experiments,  Steinhauser and H ü bner (2006) con-
fi rmed that the moment of response execution is crucial for 
task strengthening to occur. More specifi cally, they demon-
strated switch costs after corrected task errors, but switch 
benefi ts after detected but uncorrected task errors. In a recent 
experiment, we replicated the dissociation between task 
errors and response errors on switch cost. However, in addi-
tion, we showed that a task error occurring before response 
execution also infl uences subsequent switch costs. In other 
words, preparing or selecting the wrong task without execut-
ing it, will also infl uence future task performance. In sum-
mary, at a behavioral level, there is evidence that response 
and task errors have a different impact on subsequent behav-
ior (Desmet, Fias, and Brass, unpublished data). 
 As mentioned above, task errors have never been inves-
tigated at the neural level. Given the extensive debate 
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regarding the similarity/dissimilarity between response errors 
and response confl ict, this is very surprising. From a neuro-
anatomical perspective, it is not clear whether one would 
expect a dissociation of task and response errors. On the one 
hand, there are overlapping brain areas for response and task 
processing (i.e., the RCZ). On the other hand, there are also 
brain areas uniquely related to task processing. To gain fur-
ther insight into the relation of errors and confl ict at response 
and task level, we recently investigated response errors, 
response confl ict, task errors and task confl ict in one experi-
ment (Desmet et al. , 2011 ). Our data thus allow us to dis-
sociate errors and confl ict at the task and the response level. 
In our experiment, participants had to perform a letter and a 
color task in a random order. A cue indicated which task had 
to be performed (the word  ‘ color ’ or  ‘ letter ’ appeared prior 
to target onset). During the letter task, the target letter had to 
be classifi ed as L or R. During the color task the color of the 
target letter had to be classifi ed as green or yellow. Three 
trial types were presented. In catch trials, only a target letter 
was presented after cue presentation. In task change trials, a 
vertical ellipse appeared around the target letter. This ellipse 
indicated that participants did not have to perform the task 
as indicated by the cue, but had to apply the other task. For 
example, if a cue indicated to do the letter task and subse-
quently an ellipse appeared around the target, the color task 
had to be applied. A task error was defi ned as the application 
of the wrong task to the target letter. The time between target 
presentation and the appearance of the ellipse was adjusted 
according to a staircase algorithm. In this way, the amount 
of task errors was around 50 % . Finally, in stimulus change 
trials, we offered a second stimulus after target presentation. 
This second stimulus always elicited a different response than 
the target stimulus. However, the same task had to be applied. 
For example, after presentation of the letter cue, the target 
stimulus  ‘ L ’ could change into a second stimulus  ‘ R ’ . Again, 
the time between the second stimulus and the target stimulus 
was adjusted to a staircase procedure so that the amount of 
response errors was also set at 50 % . For an overview of the 
different trial types see Figure  1 . 
 We used univalent stimulus-response mappings. In particu-
lar, every possible outcome ( ‘ L ’ ,  ‘ R ’ ,  ‘ green ’ or  ‘ yellow ’ ) was 
mapped onto a different fi nger. Further, the two different tasks 
were divided over both hands. In this way, we could infer from 
the subjects ’ response which error was made. For example, 
the response  ‘ green ’ to a green R under execution of the letter 
task would comprise a task error. We found a dissociation of 
both error types in the pFMC: while response errors activate 
the RCZ, task errors activate a more dorsal part of the pFMC, 
labeled the dorsal frontomedian cortex. Further, a clear disso-
ciation was perceived between brain areas related to confl ict 
at the task and response level. In particular, as regards activ-
ity in the pFMC, task confl ict was related to activation in the 
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 Figure 1  Overview of the three trial types. 
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preSMA, while response confl ict was related to activation in 
the RCZ. In general, this study demonstrated that task related 
processing requires more dorsal parts of the pFMC than 
response related processing. Further, error related processing 
is related to more anterior parts of the pFMC than confl ict 
related processing. Finally, within each level of abstractness, 
confl ict was always more posterior and more dorsally located 
than errors (Figure  2 ) (Desmet et al. , 2011 ). 
 There are some papers that address different sub localiza-
tions in the pFMC. However these studies are restricted to 
confl ict research. For example, some studies have shown dis-
tinctions between forms of pre-response confl ict and response 
confl ict. It seems that pre-response confl ict is associated with 
more dorsal and posterior parts of the pFMC than response 
confl ict (Kim et al. , 2011 ). Others have shown an anterior to 
posterior typology, ranging from strategy control, over deci-
sion control, towards response control (Venkatraman et al. , 
2009 ). Also, decision confl ict without response confl ict seems 
to activate regions in the pFMC more dorsal than those usu-
ally found for response confl ict (Pochon et al. , 2008 ). More 
related to our distinction of task and response confl ict, Orr and 
Weissman  (2009) presented a cue and a target in two modali-
ties at the same time (visual and auditory modality). At cue 
level, the visual modality informed participants which feature 
of the target (look or hear) they should react to. The target 
comprised a spoken and a visually presented  ‘ x ’ or  ‘ o ’ . The 
authors found that confl ict between the visual and the audi-
tory information at a cue level (which represents a confl ict 
between tasks) activated dorsal parts of the pFMC while con-
fl ict at a target level (which represents confl ict at the response 
level) activated ventral parts of the pFMC. 
 So, while different levels of confl ict (see also Egner , 2008 ) 
and their corresponding brain areas have been discussed in 
 Figure 2  Peak activations in the pFMC for task errors (MNI 
coordinates of maximal random-effect Z scores, x, y, z = 6, 39, 54, 
Z = 4.45), task confl ict (MNI coordinates of maximal random-effect 
Z scores, x, y, z = – 9, 15, 57, Z = 4.03), response errors (MNI coordi-
nates of maximal random-effect Z scores, x, y, z = 6, 51, 30, Z = 3.87) 
and response confl ict (MNI coordinates of maximal random-effect Z 
scores, x, y, z = – 6, 30, 39, Z = 3.70). 
the literature, the story for different levels of error processing 
is less extensive. Previously, Krigolson and Holroyd  (2007) 
reported a dissociation between high and low level errors. 
They manipulated these two levels of error processing, in a 
movement tracking task. Participants were required to move 
a cursor from a start point to a target point by manipulating 
a joystick. However, the target point sometimes changed to a 
different location, resulting in low level errors. In some cases, 
participants could not move the cursor, making it impossible 
to achieve the movement goal. These cases were labeled as 
high level errors. The authors showed by means of ERP mea-
surements, that the frontal brain system is related to high level 
errors, while the posterior system is correlated with low level 
errors. Apart from this study and our own experiment, there 
seems to be no research concerning the sub localization of 
errors in the brain. However, the task error region that we 
described in the pFMC, has been described before in higher 
level decision processes (Elliott and Dolan , 1998 ; Goel and 
Dolan , 2000 ; Rushworth et al. , 2002 ; Volz et al. , 2003 ,  2004 ). 
Based on these fi ndings, and keeping in mind the different 
connections of the pFMC to motor output, we argued that 
more abstract errors are processed in more dorsal regions of 
the pFMC. 
 Errors and confl ict from a broader perspective 
 So far, we have given an overview of studies on confl ict and 
error processing at the task and the response level. However, 
almost all of these studies investigate very simple tasks that 
have limited ecological validity. As outlined above, confl ict 
and/or error processing, has been studied in different spatial 
and non-spatial compatibility tasks such as the fl anker task, 
the Stroop task and the Simon task. Even though a wide range 
of paradigms have been used, adaptive behavior in these sim-
plifi ed tasks is restricted to very specifi c strategies. In the 
fl anker task, for example, an error occurs when the central 
arrow is categorized incorrectly. The only possible strategy to 
prevent this error in subsequent trials, is to pay more attention 
to the central arrow. However, in many real life situations, 
an error will not only cause an increase in attention, but will 
also provide information that can be used to optimize further 
behavior. When mastering a sport such as dancing or play-
ing a musical instrument, it is crucial to learn from errors, 
in the sense that one needs to analyze what is going wrong. 
This learning aspect of errors is somewhat neglected in typi-
cal SRC tasks. As a consequence, current accounts of error 
monitoring might underestimate the cognitive operations fol-
lowing error detection. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate 
adaptive behavior in tasks that require more complex adap-
tive strategies in the case of an error. In a recent experiment, 
we addressed this issue by examining if the same post error 
adaptation effects described in SRC tasks are also present 
when performing a mental arithmetic task. Participants had 
to judge whether the solution of a multiplication problem was 
correct or not (for example 4 × 6 = 24). Confl ict was manipu-
lated by the relatedness between the solution and the prob-
lem. For example,  ‘ 4 × 6 = 21 ’ is a low confl ict trial, since 21 
Performance monitoring at the task and the response level  5
is not related to the multiplication table of 4, nor to the table 
of 6. In contrast,  ‘ 4 × 6 = 28 ’ is a high confl ict trial, since 28 is 
related to the table of 4 (4 × 7 = 28). We observed post error 
accuracy increases and post error slowing. Although from 
a control perspective, post accuracy increases are expected 
(more control is required after an error resulting in a slower 
and better performance), they are not commonly observed 
in SRC tasks (Rabbitt and Rodgers, 1977; Laming , 1979 ; 
Hajcak et al. , 2003 ; Hajcak and Simons , 2008 ). Consequently, 
we argued that tasks, where refl ection about an error is pos-
sible, will induce more than an orientation response and 
will therefore, besides post error slowing, also cause post 
error accuracy increases. Further, we did not fi nd evidence 
for confl ict adaptation. We reasoned that confl ict adaptation 
might also be an effect typically related to SRC tasks. More 
specifi cally, a recent model of confl ict adaptation states that 
only stimulus-response rules active at the moment of confl ict 
will be strengthened (Verguts and Notebaert , 2009 ). Since 
the stimulus set in mental arithmetic is substantially larger 
than the stimulus set in a SRC task, strengthening a particular 
arithmetic problem will not be benefi cial on subsequent trials. 
For example, strengthening  ‘ 4 × 6 = 24 ’ will not be benefi cial if 
on the next trial  ‘ 3 × 5 = 15 ’ is presented ( Desmet, De Brauwer, 
Imbo, Brass, Fias and Notebaert, unpublished ). Given these 
behavioral differences of adaptive processes in SRC tasks and 
tasks that require more complex adaptive processes, it might 
be interesting to investigate if there is also a neural distinction 
between these more  ‘ cognitive ’ arithmetic errors and errors 
resulting from classical SRC tasks. 
 Conclusion 
 Adaptive control has been widely studied in cognitive neuro-
science over the last two decades. This research, however, is 
dominated by investigating a specifi c type of error and con-
fl ict in a very restricted set of experimental paradigms. Here, 
we argue that it is necessary to investigate adaptive control in 
a wider range of experimental tasks and to distinguish adap-
tive control at different levels. 
 Firstly, we showed that brain regions associated with errors 
and confl ict at more abstract levels of processing can be dis-
tinguished from brain regions related to response related pro-
cessing. One important question for future research is how 
behavior is adapted when confl ict and errors occur at a more 
abstract level such as the task level. Both behavioral data 
( Steinhauser and H ü bner, 2008 ) as well as brain imaging data 
(Desmet et al. , 2011 ) suggest that it is important to distinguish 
adaptive control at the task and the response level. 
 Secondly, we provided evidence that behavioral effects 
that have been extensively described and that have served 
as evidence for human adaptive control, might be restricted 
to a specifi c class of experimental paradigms. When using a 
mental arithmetic task instead of a SRC task, the behavioral 
adaptation effects changed profoundly. 
 To conclude, considering the wide variety in which errors 
occur in daily life, the focus of current studies of error and 
confl ict monitoring is relatively narrow. As described above, 
highlighting different aspects of error and confl ict processing, 
changes the neural and behavioral results. Thus, in order to 
make correct extrapolations about the human ability to pro-
cess errors and confl ict and to gain further insight into these 
processes, a broader research perspective should be used. 
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